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Articles
H.J. Glasbeek* The Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Movement - The Latest in
Maginot Lines to Save
Capitalism
I. Introduction
The modem corporation bad a battle to be accepted as a legitimate
institution'. In England it was initially seen as a device which might lead
to the undermining of individual responsibility2, in the United States as
subjugating the individual and individualism to the needs of the
organization, 3 and in Canada as offending the dignity of labour and
* This article contains the text of the thirteenth Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered
at Dalhousie Law School, September 17, 1987. The author is a Professor of Law, Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1. The cause of the difficulty was well-stated by A. Berle, Economic Power and the Free
Society (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1958), at 16: "Whenever there is a question
of power there is a question of legitimacy. As things stand now, these [corporations] have the
slenderest claim of legitimacy, which also means finding a field of responsibility and a field of
accountability. Legitimacy, responsibility and accountability are essential to any power system
if it is to endure." For early doubts about the corporation's legitimacy, see J.W. Hurst, The
Legitimacy of the Business Corporation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970) at
30-44; L. Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought in Pennsylvania 1776-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948) at 78-79; Thurmond Arnold, The Folklore of
Capitalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), Chapter VIII; W.W. Cook, The
Corporation Problem: The Public Phases of Corporations, Their Uses, Abuses (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1891).
2. After modem corporations bad been accorded the privilege of limited liability, The Law
Times, 21 June, 1856, referred to the legislation as a Rogues' Charter;, E. Herman, Corporate
Control Corporate Power (London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney:
Cambridge U. P., 1981) at 259 cites William Hazlitt, Table Talk - (London: Everyman
Edition, 1952), to the following effect: "Corporate bodies are more corrupt and profligate than
individuals, because they have more power to do mischief, and they are less amenable to
disgrace or punishment. They feel neither shame, remorse, gratitude, nor goodwill." (at 264).
3. See John P. Davis, Corporations; A Study of the Origin andDevelopment of Great Business
Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State (New York and London: The
Knickerbocker Press, 1905), (reprint edition, William S. Hein, Buffalo, 1986). At page 3 Davis
refers to an interview with Henry Watterson, as reported in the New York Journal of
November 29, 1896: "In 1800 we were a few millions of people and we loved liberty. In 1900
we are nearly a hundred millions of people and we love money. Moreover, individually and
collectively, we have a great deal of money. Most of this money is invested in what I call
corporations. From a handful of individuals we have become a nation of institutions. The
individual counts for less and less, organizations for more and more. It is the idiosyncrasy of
the age we live in." Similarly, Charles Francis Adams, "The Place of Corporate Action in
Civilization", Chapter (iv) of Shaler's The United States of America, Volume II, at 197, is
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endangering the political entente. 4 In 1932, Berle and Means5 showed
that most of the wealth in the United States was in the hands of
corporations and a large proportion of that corporate wealth was
controlled by a relatively small number of dominant corporations.
6
Vigorous public debates ensued, the best known of which was the one
carried on between Berle and Dodd.7 The issue was whether or not
corporations should act with a social conscience. By the mid-1950s,
Berle, who had argued that corporations should not have such a duty,
had acknowledged that corporations had come to accept that corporate
power was to be used by corporate directors and officials not only for the
benefit of shareholders but also on behalf of the entire community.8
While the issue as to whether or not corporations ought to have a
social conscience and act upon it has not, as yet, been settled, it is true to
say that, in North America, after World War II, corporations had come
to enjoy a degree of acceptability and respect that they had not had in the
late 19th and early 20th century. Examples abound. Thus it is that, in
1968, 9 The Woods Task Force on Labour Relations 10 argued:
quoted by Davis, at 4: "[One of the evil effects of corporate organizations] is that we shall have,
in place of the independent businessman of today, each gaining his livelihood by his success in
a wide range of thought and action, a body of clerklike functionaries, each of whom will do
a certain limited kind of work at the command of his superiors."
4. The Canadian revolutionary Mackenzie included the following provision in his Draft
Constitution: "s. 56. There shall never be created within this State any incorporated trading
companies or incorporated companies with banking powers. Labour is the only means of
creating wealth." See. The Constitution, Nov. 15, 1837; D. Creighton, The Empire of the St
Lawrence, at 278-80, recorded that, in 1830, Papineau objected to the idea of limited liability
and the undue political influence of big corporations, particularly banks.
5. A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:
MacMillan, 1932).
6. This was by no means the first finding of the amassment of wealth by the corporate sector.
See Richard T. Ely, "The Growth of Corporations," Harper's Magazine, Volume 75, at 71
(June 1895), who thought that at least one-fourth of the total value of all property in the
United States was held by corporations and that this proportion was increasing rapidly.
Similarly, Justice Field, at the centennial celebration of the organization of the federal
judiciary, New York, February 4, 1890, 134 U.S.R., 742 (as quoted in Davis, supra, note 3,
at 2) thought that nearly four-fifths of the entire property of the country was held by the
corporate sector. What was new in Berle's and Means' findings was that they concluded that
shareholders were not in control of the dominant corporations; management was. The issues
this raises are central to this paper.
7. Berle, "Corporate Powers in Trust" (1931), 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049; "For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees" (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365; Dodd, "For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees?" (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, "Is Effective Enforcement of the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Trustees Practicable?" (1934), 2 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 194.
8. The Twenfieth-Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1954), and
Economic Power and the Free Society (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1958).
9. The date is important, as will become apparent below.
10. Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, Canadian Industrial Relations, (Ottawa:
Privy Council Office, 1968).
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement
The principle of freedom under the law, in an environment designed to
facilitate individual development and participation, has produced in North
America a pluralistic society reflecting a multitude of cultural
backgrounds, values, interests and goals. The underlying concepts of the
free individual, private property and freedom of contract have produced
an essentially capitalistic, although mixed enterprise, economy. Subject to
certain qualifications, the key element within this system is the corporation,
a legal entity which provides a means both for the accumulation of capital
and for limiting the risks of enterprise to that capital. [Emphasis added.]
It is clear that the corporation was deemed to have a central and
beneficient place in Canadian society, both economically and politically.
Again, since the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms," the
Supreme Court of Canada has had no difficulty in finding that
corporations have as much right to claim the benefit of political rights
and freedoms, such as the right to freedom of religion and the right to
privacy,12 as any warm-blooded human being. Nor is there any longer
any real question (either in the United States or in Canada) as to whether
or not corporations, as such, can participate in electoral politics by
funding parties and/or candidates. The only issue seems to be whether or
not financial limitations can be imposed on corporate donors.13
Less formally but, I believe, just as importantly, corporations are
perceived as vital, live economic and political actors by the general
population. For instance, unions speaking about their struggle with
employers will frequently refer to the "corporation" as not wanting to do
something, or as making unacceptable demands for concessions, and so
forth. This is a tell-tale acknowledgement of reality: employers are
normally corporations. While this is obviously a legal truism, the fact that
workers see beyond their immediate bosses and supervisors when they
want to identify their real employer is suggestive of the pervasive
presence and legitimacy of the corporate structure. Similarly, when
public policies are being discussed, it is common for the protagonists to
address the issue of the corporate sector's desires, wants and opinions in
respect of the policies under discussion, thereby suggesting that
corporations have wants, desires and opinions. In line with this
perception, note that, in recent times, it has become the conventional
I1. Constitution Ac4 1982, Part I - Schedule B - Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
12. R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, 11985] 1 S.C.R 295; Hunter v. Southarm, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
13. See R.G. Atkey, "Corporate Political Activity" (1985), 23 Uni. West Ont. L.R. 129; M.
Tushnet, "Corporations and Free Speech", in D. Kairys (ed.) The Politics of Law;, A
Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon books, 1982). Note that not only can corporations
enter into contracts, be subjected to standards leading to civil liability, and be the subject of
administrative regulation, but they also have sufficient legal personality to commit crimes.
These liabilities bolster their legitimacy when they abide by legal standards.
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wisdom of politics in this part of the world that there ought to be an
abandonment of state intervention in the economy, leaving it to the
private sector 4 (often referred to as the corporate sector) to produce
welfare. This notion reflects the views of business as they are made
known by umbrella groups, such as the Federation of Independent
Business and the National Council on Business Issues, and by chief
executive officers of large corporations. The latter frequently speak on
public issues, consult with, and are consulted by, politician and public
servants. It is the association of these prominent men (and they are nearly
all men) with large corporations which give them their standing and
which bestows legitimacy upon their expressed views.
In part, no doubt, much of the modem, largely unquestioning
acceptance of corporations as legitimate actors is due to the fact that
corporations, as such, have come to be seen as central to the economy
and thus to the polity. But, while it is true that the economic centrality of
corporations has made their participation in both economic and political
life seem utterly natural, it does not follow that their contribution to the
good of society is seen as being anything but indirect. Indeed, the debate
as to whether or not corporations should specifically be required to
promote social welfare, as well as engage in the maximization of profits,
has continued and, recently, has increased in intensity.' 5 More
14. This hardly needs documentation but, as the point is somewhat important to this paper,
note that in February, 1978, Canadian First Ministers asked the Economic Council of Canada
to study the problems of government regulation because "[t]he burden of government
regulation on the private sector should be reduced and the burden of overlapping federal and
provincial jurisdiction should be eliminated." See C.D. Hunt and A.R. Lucas, Environmental
Regulation, (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1980), Preface V. This was a study
done for the Economic Council of Canada in response to this direction of the First Ministers
who, in turn, had been influenced by incessant lobbying by the private sector.
15. The literature is too voluminous to list; most of it is American. See, ag., P. Drucker,
Concept of the Corporation (New York: John Day & Co., 1946); A. Hacker "Politics and the
Corporation: An Occasional Paper on the Role of the Corporation in a Free Society", (New
York: Fund for the Republic, 1958); E. Mason (ed.), The Corporation in Modem Society
(Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1960); M. Anshen & G. Bach (eds.), Management and
Corporations 1985, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
(Chicago: Uni. of Chi. P, 1962); A. Hacker (ed.) The Corporation Take-Over (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965); J. Wiener, "The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the
Corporation" (1964), 64 Col. L. Rev. 1458; M. Schlusberg "Corporate Legitimacy and Social
Responsibility: The Role of Law" (1969), 12 Cal. Management Rev. 65; M. Heald, The Social
Reponsibility of Business: Company and Community 1900-1969, (Cleveland: Press of Western
Reserve Union, 1970); R. Lamer, Management Control and the Large Corporation, (New
York: Dunellen, 1970); D. Bell, "The Corporation and Society in the 1970's" (1971), No. 24,
Public Interest, 5; P.S. Sethi, Up Against the Corporate Wall- Modern Corporations and Social
Issues of the Seventies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); H. Manne and H.
Wallich, The Modern Corporation and Social Responsibility (Washington: AEI for Public
Policy Research, 1972); C. Perrow, The RadicalAttack on Business: A CriticalAnalysis, (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972); R. Nader and M. Green, Corporate Power in
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interestingly, there has been a change in emphasis in argument of those
who favour imposing a duty of social responsibility on corporations: in
addition to advocating the existence and/or need of this duty, they have
gone on to provide detailed blueprints as to how this desideratum should
be operationalized. In particular, they have called for changes in the
governance and objectives of corporations.' 6
This paper examines the nature of this corporate social responsibility
movement. Well-traversed ground will be covered. I will begin with a
description of the legal attributes of the corporation and the economic
assumptions which underly the validity and justification for the corporate
device. Only as much will be done as is necessary to provide a setting in
which to raise the following questions:
(a) Does it make theoretical sense to argue for reform of corporate
governance with a view to the promotion of corporate social
responsibility?
(b) Whatever the answer to this question, could such changes in
corporate governance ever be efficacious17?
America, (New York: Grossman, 1973); D. Linowes, The Corporate Conscience (New York:
Hawthorn, 1974); James McKie (ed.), Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament,
(Washington: Brookings institute, 1974); The Social Responsibilities of Business, Social
Science Research Council, (London, 1975); C. Stone, Where the Law Ends (New York:
Harper & Row, 1975); R. Nader, M. Green, J. Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New
York: Norton, 1976); Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977); C.
Walton (ed.), The Ethics of Corporate Conduct (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977);
A. Caroll (Ed.), Managing Corporate Responsibility (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1977);
Irving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: New American Library, 1978); A.
Collier, "The Co-Corp: Big Business Can Re-Form Itself", [1979] Harvard Bus. Rev. 121; E.
Epstein and D. Votaw (eds.), Rationality, Legitimacy, Responsibility (Santa Monica, Ca.:
Goodyear Publishing Co., 1980); T. Bradshaw & D. Vogel (eds.), Corporations and Their
Critics; Issues and Answers to the Problems of Corporate Responsibility (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1981); K. Goodpaster & J. Matthews, "Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?", [1982]
Harvard Bus. Rev. 132; E. Herman, Corporate Control Corporate Power (Cambridge,
London, N.Y.: Cambridge U.P., 1981); M. Novak & J. Cooper (eds.) The Corporation: A
Theological Inquiry (Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research, 1981); K. Whitnow, "The
Moral Crisis in American Capitalism," [1982] Harv. Bus. Rev. 76; "Corporate Social
Performance in Canada", Royal Commission on Corporate Concentrations, (Ottawa: Ministry
of Supply and Services, 1978), Study 21; J.E. Smyth, "The Social Implications of
Incorporation" in J. Ziegel (ed.), Studies in Canadian Company Law, (Toronto: Butt 1967),
Chapter 21; J.L. Howard "The Proposals for a New Business Corporations Act for Canada:
Concepts and Policies", Special Lectures, 1972, Law Society of Upper Canada, 17; J.L.
Howard "Corporate Law in the 80s - An Overview", Special Lectures, 1982, Law Society
of Upper Canada, 5; Hadden, Forbes, Simmonds, Canadian Business Organizations Law,
(Toronto: Butt. 1984), Chapters 2, 5 (part 8); S. Beck "Corporate Power and Public Policy"
in I. Bernier & A. Lajoie (eds.), Consumer Protection, Environmental Law and Corporate
Power, vol. 50 in the series of studies for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1985).
16. Some of the main proposals for change will be detailed below; see section III of this paper.
17. As it is the argument of this paper that corporations in a liberal capitalist society are
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(c) If the answer is no to (a), to (b) or to both - as I will argue it
obviously ought to be - what really impels the movement promoting
corporate social responsibility?
This last question is raised to prepare the way for an argument that the
corporate social responsibility movement's agenda is the continued
legitimation of capitalist liberal democracy.
II. Views of the Corporation
1. The LegalApproach
For the purposes of this paper, a skeletal outline of the legal attributes of
a corporation is all that is necessary. Indeed, a detailed description would
lead to unnecessary obfuscation. The idea of the presentation is to
determine how the fundamental legal rules and concepts fit with the
notion of corporate social responsibility.
(a) A corporation is a legal person in its own right, separate from the
investors who contribute the capital necessary for its existence. It
holds the corporate property in its own name.
(b) Inasmuch as a corporation incurs debts, the members of the
corporation, that is, the shareholders, are responsible to the extent to
which they have invested in the corporation. Their private assets are
not to be encumbered by corporate debt.
(c) A corporation has a statement of objectives which its managers are
to pursue. This statement is usually very open-ended in its phrasing.
Management is left, as a matter of law, to a board of directors which
is charged with acting in the interests of the corporation. The
directors have to balance the long-term and short-term interests of
the corporation.
(d) The board of directors of the corporation is subject to the direction
of the members of the corporation as expressed by them from time
to time. There is, thus, a form of shareholder democracy. Members
are allocated a number of votes to which their shareholding (i.e.
investment) entitles them.
nothing but vehicles for profit-maximization, that they will continue to be so and that the
corporate social responsibility movement refuses to face the implications of this fact, it is not
essential for me to tease out all the refinements of the theoretical arguments arising out of
questions (a) and (b) in the text. This has been done with great thoroughness by Howard
"Corporate Law in the 80's - An Overview" in Special Lectures, Law Society of Upper
Canada, Corporate Law in the 80's (Don Mills: Richard De Boo, 1982); Engel, "An Approach
to Corporate Social Responsibility" (1979), 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1; Romano, "Metapolitics and
Corpoate Law Reform" (1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923. Engel's article is particularly useful in
the way it addresses the question of the efficacy of the various proposals.
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(e) Directors owe a trustee-like obligation to the corporation when
corporate assets are in their possession and these form the subject of
dealings.
(f) Directors may not use their position within the corporation to profit
personally, or in such a way that it appears that they might. They
must exploit potential profit-making opportunities on behalf of the
corporation.
This outline suffices for the purposes of this paper in which I am not
concerned with the quality of the duties which flow from the legal
organization of corporations. This is the stuff of corporate law texts,
courses and practices; a side-long glance is all that is needed here.
As a matter of law, directors are not meant to be experts18. Their
operational framework is the rather ill-defined notion of the best interests
of the corporation. It follows that there will always be room for dispute
as to whether or not they have acted appropriately. Questions such as
whether or not they ought to resist takeover or merger attempts and, if so,
what tactics they are entitled to employ, raise this difficulty squarely.
What is in the best interests of the corporation in such a situation? Who
decides? Does it matter whether some shareholders are at a disadvantage
if a majority of the shareholders approve (or disapprove) of a proposed
takeover or merger? In such a case, or in any other, should minority
shareholders who feel that the action of the directors has hurt their
interests and that the directors are in breach of their duty to the
corporation, be given a right to sue on behalf of the corporation (the
much-discussed and very restricted derivative action) or sue the directors
in their own right?19 When can shareholders found a legal claim that they
have been oppressed or unfairly prejudiced by acts or omissions of the
corporation and/or of the directors? 20 Can a large corporation be held
responsible for the conflicting acts of two of its directors?2' And so forth.
18. See, eg., s 134(1) Business Corporations Act S.O. 1982, c. 4. They are to exercise business
judgment rather than prudent-like trustee judgment. They are different from trustees because
they can be dismissed by the majority of shareholders and because there is a need to be
imaginative in risk-taking.
19. See Beck, "The Shareholders' Derivative Action" (1974), 52 Can. B. Rev. 159. For a
more recent discussion of majority-minority shareholder conflicts, see Anisman, "Majority-
Minority Relations in Canadian Corporation Law: An Overview" (1986), 12 Can. Bus. L. Jo.
473.
20. For a thorough recent discussion, see Rock, Garvic, Glass and Newman, "Fiduciary
Duties in the Corporate Setting", paper presented at a seminar "Fiduciary Duties: A Matter of
Trust" by the Law Society of Upper Canada, Continuing Legal Education, Nov. 22, 1986.
21. Standard Investments Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1985), 22 D.L.R.
(4th) 410 (Ont. C.A.); Austin, "The Corporate Fiduciary: Standard Investments Ltd v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" (1986), 12 Can. Bus. L. Jo. 96; Crawford, "Bankers'
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It is clear that the difficulties and refinements raised by these many
issues, so troubling and so dear to corporate lawyers, do not affect the
central idea, namely that the corporation and its directors are there to
further the interests of the corporation and, thereby, the interests of the
shareholders.22 The nature and scope of the duties of the players inter se
turn on the definition of how these interests are best served. In general,
the best interests of shareholders and of the corporation are assumed to
be a positive return on the investments made.23
As thus set out, the tenets of the law's approach to the corporation
leaves the argument for the imposition of a qualitatively different kind of
duty on the corporation and its directors - that is, the duty to be socially
responsible - largely devoid of merit. The existing duties of profit-
maximization and the promotion of shareholder satisfaction, are, despite
the many legal nuances and difficulties adumbrated above, symbiotic and
are believed to be capable of being given a concrete, tangible meaning
and content. For the corporation and its directors to be asked to balance
such duties and interests against interests in respect of which there are no
rational criteria, other than some vague notion of social responsibility,
would lead, at least from the legal point of view, to serious difficulties for
decision-makers. To put unweighted corporate social responsibility in
one pan of the scales and difficult-enough to determine duties to the
corporation and shareholders in the other, would test the courts, who are
to calibrate the scales, severely. Decisions as to the scope of the legal
responsibility of the corporation, directors and majority shareholders
would become the product of obvious guess-work. 24
2. The Economists'Approach
There is a great deal of coincidence between the arguments relying on the
Fiduciary Duties and Negligence" (1986), 12 Can. Bus. L. Jo. 145; Ziegel, "Bankers' Fiduciary
Obligations and Chinese Walls: A further comment on Standard Investments Ltd v. Canadian
ImperialBank of Commerce" (1986), 12 Can. Bus. L. Jo. 211.
22. It is probably this essentially simple truth, of which most corporate law studied and
practised is a refinement, which prompted Manning's much quoted appraisal that "corporation
law, as a field of intellectual effort is dead... We have nothing left but our great corporation
statutes - towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing
nothing but wind". From Bayless Manning, "The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker" (1962), 72 Yale U. 223 at 245.
23. I have used the phrase "a positive return on the investments made" at this stage because,
as will be noted, it is argued by the members of the corporate social responsibility movement
that absolute profit maximization is not what all corporations seek, nor what should be
expected of them.
24. It is in this context that Wedderburn has argued that the American judiciary's attempt to
require fairness of directors would merely finish up by judges replacing the business judgment
of directors with their own judgement. He is unimpressed by this prospect; see his "The Social
Responsibility of Companies" (1965), 15 Melb. U.L.R. 4 at 18 etseq.
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internal logic of the law which lead to the conclusion that the imposition
of corporate social responsibility would result in incoherence and those
used by classic economists who hold the same view. What underlies the
economic arguments of classical economists such as Hayek25 and
Friedman26 is a particular vision of the corporation. Thus, Friedman
argues that the best way to organize productive activities is to develop an
ideal market system (as opposed to a command, planned centralized
regime). An ideal market system is one in which all individuals, as
individuals, seek to achieve their personal goals by making the best use
of their personal abilities and capacities and the inanimate resources
which they control. Given a society which is complex enough to warrant
a division of labour, this will require that individuals put themselves in a
position to exchange that which they can most efficiently produce for
things which they need and are produced by others who are also
maximizing their abilities, capacities and belongings. If all individuals are
free to behave in this self-enhancing way, then, given a perfectly
operating market, (that is, one in which there is as much information as
is necessary and there are as little transaction costs as possible), an
optimal allocation of goods and resources will ensue. Furthermore, the
advantage of such a market system is that individuals will make their
own sovereign decisions; the more individuals are left to make their own
decisions, the less need there is for the external imposition of standards
and regulations by the State. In sum, a freely operating market of this
kind produces an efficient allocation of resources, enhances individual
self-satisfaction and promotes liberty and freedom. Friedman sees the
corporation as a facilitator in this scheme. For him, the corporation does
not distort the operation of the ideal market provided that the
corporation's activities are aimed at more efficiently carrying out the
wishes of the individual investors who have created it. Note that this
makes the classical economists' assumption that, all things being equal,
people will prefer more to less control: if it is accurate, the corporation's
drive to maximize profits will coincide with the objective of the
individuals who are members (that is, shareholders) of the corporation. In
this framework, it would be wrongful to ask a corporation to do
something which would fly in the face of its members' wishes, such as
looking after the interests of the unemployed, just as it would run counter
to our understanding of liberty and freedom to impose positive duties on
human individuals to act altruistically towards others. 27
25. Law, Legislation andLiberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
26. Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 1962).
27. Note here that the Friedman assumption that profit-maximizing corporations will be
acting in the best interests of individual shareholders is, of course, clouded by the fact that it
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3. A Revisionist View of the Corporation
Those who would like to impose a duty on corporations to be socially
responsible argue that the underlying assumptions of the legal and
economists' approaches set out above have no empirical basis, nor
political justification in modem economic society.
These advocates of the imposition of corporate social responsibility
take their cue from the work of Berle and Means.28 It will be remembered
that these scholars found that the promotion of the accumulation of
capital by providing for limited responsibility and by easing the rules of
registration had worked all too well. They revealed that two-thirds of the
United States of America's industrial wealth had been transferred from
individual holdings to corporate holdings. Furthermore, they showed that
the concentration of wealth was increasing in the United States. In
addition, and for the purposes of the corporate social responsibility
movement's arguments, most importantly, they found that "production is
carried on under the ultimate control of a handful of individuals" in
corporations 29; a huge amount of the property was contributed by a great
number of individual, small investors, each of whom had very little
interest in controlling all of the capital, leaving it to be controlled by the
managers of the corporation. According to Berle and Means,
concentration of capital and dispersion of ownership had become a very
significant fact of life. The picture they painted was one of ownership of
wealth without control, and control exercised by those who were not
owners.30 To the corporate social responsibility movement protagonists
the importance of this analysis is that profit-maximization is not the
overriding goal of corporate management. This is so because the profits
go to shareholders and not to managers who, therefore, are not as
interested in producing as much gain as possible and who can, within
some rather loosely constructed constraints, pursue their own interests. In
his very influential work,3' John Kenneth Galbraith claimed that
managers of large corporations did just that: he argued that they were
has become manifest that, in many cases, some of the investors are not happy with the way that
their corporation behaves. The idea of governance by shareholder majority runs counter to the
individualism which the ideal market model requires to be perpetuated. This is the basis for the
tensions which underly much of the law so crudely described earlier in the text. For a short
discussion of the arguments, pro and con, in respect of the conguence of shareholder an
corporate interest in profit-maximization, see Romano, supra, note 17 at 953.
28. Supra, note 5.
29. Berle and Means, supra, note 5.
30. They found that 65 per cent of the major 200 corporations (or 80 per cent of the 200
leading corporations' capital) was controlled by a legal device such as a holding company, a
financial institution or management divorced from investors.
31. The New Industrial State, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
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more interested in stability and empire building (which enured to the
managers' benefit and prestige) than they were in profit-maximization as
such. The only constraint on management was that they had to ensure
enough of a dividend to satisfy contributing shareholders at any one time.
As long as there were satisfactory returns, it would be economically
foolish for investors to spend much time on scrutinizing the activities of
a large, complicated corporation, even in the rare instances in which they
had the skills and the resources to do so.
This is where social responsibility proponents pick up the argument.
They want to ensure that managerial power be exercised in a way which
is more compatible with their goals and purposes, that is, non profit-
maximizing purposes. The reasoning is that if management already does
not pursue profits single-mindedly and this is either acceptable and/or an
inevitable fact of life, management legitimately can be asked to use its
discretion less selfishly, that is, in a less management-benefit oriented
way. Of course, to make that argument the social responsibility
proponents must also have a vision of the corporation as being more than
an organization for the accumulation of capital in order to maximize
profits, in order to accumulate more capital, leading to more profits, etc.
The have to have a notion that the corporation is a legal device created
for the purpose of furthering larger social policies. This departs
dramatically from both the existing legal understanding and the classical
economists' approach to corporate organization.
III. Proposals for the Restructuring of Corporate Governance
These proposals range from requirements that there be some reforms
which will make the corporation more efficient as a profit-maximizer to
requirements that the corporation be so structured as to reflect larger
societal needs.
(i) It is the conventional wisdom that, in large corporations, the board of
directors (the body legally charged with responsibility for the
corporation's acts and welfare) is often the creature of the day-to-day
managerial personnel. That is, the directors are either those managers
and/or their appointees. 32 In this context, there have been many
suggestions that independent directors should be put on the governing
board of corporations. Inasmuch as the purpose of such appointments
would be to ensure that shareholder preferences will be more respected
than they are when an unchecked management and its pet directors are
32. Mace, "The President and the Board of Directors" (1973), Harvard Bus. Rev. 37; Mace,
Directors: Myths and Realities (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Graduate School of Business, 1971).
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in charge,33 the appointment of independent directors would merely be a
way of making the corporate structure conform better to the classical
legal and economic visions of the corporation.
(ii) This is also true of a variety of proposals which seek to reinforce the
directors' and managers' ability to meet their fudiciary-type obligations.
In this category we find proposals for audit committees of boards of
directors. They are to be given all the information necessary so that they
can aid the directors and managers to avoid conflict of interest
situations.34 Another such proposal is that independent directors should
be given the task of determining managerial salaries.
35
(iii) Within the corporations themselves there has been a discernible
movment which aims at ensuring that directors and managerial boards
behave in a professional manner. Codes of Conduct have become
common 36. There have been recommendations that schools be created at
which directors could acquire appropriate professional standards.3 7
Schemes to impose limits on the control that managers exercise over
employees personal lives have been established. For instance, there are
limits, created by the corporation themselves, on the dissemination and
collection of information by restricting access to the personal files of
employees. Codes of conduct and, in some of the United States,
legislation, provide that whistle-blowers, that is, employees who feel that
the corporation is doing something wrongful and want to tell the
appropriate authorites about it, should be protected 8 Some corporations
have set up in-house ombudspersons' offices to which employees can
bring their grievances, thereby putting restraints on the arbitrary exercise
of authority by managers. It is apparent that these kinds of schemes do
not require a different understanding of the corporation than either
Milton Friedman or the existing legal system have of the nature of the
corporation.
33. See Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation" A Legal Analysis (Boston: Little Brown
& Co., 1976) for the clearest exposition of this proposal and view.
34. See: Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, 1978), (the Bryce Report), at 306 etseq.
35. Steckmet, Corporate Performance: The Key to Public Trust (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1982), at 159 etseq.
36. Eg., Alexander, "Corporate Political Behaviour" in Bradshaw and Vogel, supra, note 15,
found that 77 out of 79 corporations responding to a questionnaire said that they had a code
of conduct.
37. Earle, "Corporate Governance and the Outside Director - A Modest Proposal" (1979),
36 Wash & Lee L.J. 787.
38. For an evaluation, see Nader, Petkes & Blackwell (eds.) Whistle Blowing. The Report of
the Conference on Professional Responsibility (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972);
Westin & Salisbury (eds.), Individual Rights in the Corporation: A Reader on Employee Rights
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
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(iv) There have been a complicated set of proposals which seek to create
better communication channels bewteen the component parts of a large
corporation. The idea is that corporate directors should not have ugly
facts hidden from their view so that they can control employees who,
under pressure to perform and to deliver, may behave somewhat too
aggressively and too anti-socially. Many of these proposals require that
special directors be appointed to see that information is available, giving
the directors the opportunity to ensure that the corporation is in
compliance with legislation which safeguards society, such as anti-trust
legislation, consumer and environment protection legislation, etc. It is
clear that proposals for structures which would deny corporations the
facility to behave illegally do not stem from any new notions of the
corporation. Both the classical economists and the existing legal structure
take it as a given that corporations, like any other economic actors, must
stay within the bounds of existing law.
(v) There has been a movement to make the use of proxy campaigns"
more effective. This has enjoyed some notoriety over recent time. For
instance, people who objected to the production and use of chemicals in
the pursuit of the war in Vietman, bought shares in companies like Dow
Chemical and sought to have resolutions passed at annual meetings to
halt the production of Agent Orange. A recent example involved the
infant formula campaign against Nestl6.39 Such campaigns are very
difficult to win40 but they may have an educational effect on the
corporation. These tactics, however, are in line with the traditional
economic and legal view of the corporation because the proxy
mechanism is one in which investors seek to use their shareholder power
to influence management to behave in a particular way, to appoint
certain kinds of director, to refute certain kinds of profit-making activites,
such as the making of Agent Orange, the rejection of profit-making
activities in certain parts of the world, such as South Africa, etc. 41 Clearly,
39. Nestl6 aggressively advertised and sold infant formula it produced in Third World
countries. Not only could impoverished people, in reality, not afford such a luxury, often they
were not well-enough educated to resist the blandishments of "nurses" in white smocks. In
addition, the quality of the water needed to make up the mixture often led to disease which
could have been avoided by natural breastfeeding. Eventually, Nestl6 agreed to stop these
practices. For a a summary of these events, see "Infant Formula: Hawking Disaster in the Third
World" (1987), 8, No. 4 Multi-national Monitor, 20.
40. . Crte, The Proxy System in Canadian Corporations - A Critical Analysis (Montreal:
Editions Wilson Lafleur Martel Lt~e, 1986) shows the mechanism is rarely used in Canada
and, when used, has proved utterly ineffective. See also: R. Dahl, "Governing the Giant
Corporation" in R. Nader and M. Green, supra, note 15; Investor Research Responsibility
Center Inc., The 1978 Proxy Seasorn How Institutions Voted on Shareholder Resolutions and
Management Proposals (Sept. 1978).
41. Campaign GM proposed a committee of shareholders to promote corporate responsibility.
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if the majority of shareholders can be persuaded that these things ought
to happen, no departure from the economic or legal vision of the
corporation is required for boards of directors to accede to such
proposals.
(vi) Some of the proposals, however, have more than one goal.42 Thus,
frequently arguments for the appointment of independent and/or special
interest directors are associated with the idea that these directors should
look out for the public interest, rather than just make sure that
shareholder (rather than managerial) interests are advanced. Likewise,
the suggestions for programmes for the education of directors in a
generalist kind of way are made with a view to sensitize boards of
directors to the notions of the protection of public interests. One of the
more dramatic proposals of this kind is that government-appointed
directors and inspectors be inserted into the corporate structure,
presumably with general or specific mandates to protect certain social
interests. Most arresting has been the suggestion that two-thirds of the
directors of major corporate boards should be nationally appointed.
43
These kinds of proposals manifest a view of the corporation which can be
differentiated from that evinced by the economists of the classical school
and which is reflected in the trappings of contemporary law.
Inasmuch as the proposals on offer merely want to make the
corporation work better as a vehicle for shareholder advancement (by
providing better information to directors to ensure that the shareholders'
interests are pursued and that the law is obeyed), an empirical question
is raised by the proposals. It may well be the case that there is no, or little,
evidence that the existing forms of corporate governance do not serve
shareholders well enough or, more pertinently, if they do not do so
because of boards of directors' subservience to managers who pursue
their own interests, that independently appointed directors would be
better at resisting the blandishments and pressures of managers who
The committee was to be constituted by representatives of various social and economic
interests who were to become members of the corporation which could then be expected to use
its position to promote social welfare. For a description, see Schwartz, "The Public-Interest
Proxy Context: Reflections on Campaign OM" (1971), 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419. For details of
the Agent Orange proxy fight, see Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC (1970),
432 E 2d 659; for a description of some of the South African proxy fights, see the Task Force
on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Investment in Oppression (Rev. ed., Toronto:
TCCR, 1979).
42. See Schwartz, supra, note 41; D. Vogel, Lobbying The Corporation: Citizen Challenges to
BusinessAuthority (New York: Basic Books, 1978).
43. See Weiss, "Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance
System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse" (1981), 28 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 343.
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control the corporation.44 The merits of these kinds of proposals for
changes in corporate structure stand or fall on evidence; there is no
question of theoretical incoherence causing political problems. This is not
true of proposals which seek to change the agenda of corporations.
As has been seen, the idea behind some of the proposals is that
corporate profit-maximization will affect the interests of many people
and that they, as people affected, should be allowed to defend themselves.
This corresponds to the assumptions of a pluralistic society, that is, one
in which the best decisions, the ones most acceptable to the whole of
society, will be made after all the issues are vigorously debated and
fought about by the various interest groups affected. What needs to be
done to make this work is to provide adequate processes allowing for
active participation in debate and decision-making. The ultimate
decisions made thereafter should be acceptable to society at large.
Whatever the merits of this kind of argument in respect of the larger
polity, the theory is problematic when it is sought to be applied to
corporate governance.
As profit-making activites by corporations leads to externalities, or
neighbourhood effects, there is a need to internalize the cost of these
external effects to the suppliers and demanders in the exchange chain.
This is not mandated by any novel notions of corporate social
responsibility but by the precepts of the ideal market which require that
the true costs of production are to be included in the price of a product
or service; only thus will we get the most beneficial use and allocation of
our resources. If corporate governance restructuring by, say, the
appointment of special directors, leads to supervisory schemes which
ensure that corporations will internalize such costs, the restructuring will
be merely a means which helps ensure that competitive capitalism is not
undermined by any peculiarities of corporate governance which make it
difficult to internalize costs. Proposals offered for these purposes do not
impose a duty of social responsibility on the corporation in the sense of
requiring altruistic behaviour. But, proposals for specially appointed
directors and other such mechanisms are frequently made to internalize
costs more effectively and to inhibit profit-maximization on behalf of the
corporation and shareholders so that other groups - non-shareholders
- wil benefit. Inasmuch as the latter goal is to be pursued the proposals
are quite radical. They hinge on the precept that profit-maximization
44. Indeed, the literature suggests that shareholders do no better with independent directors.
See Romano, supra, note 17; Brudney, "The Independent Director - Heavenly City or
Potemkin Vilage"(1982), 95 Harv. L.R. 633; Wedderburn, "Trust, Corporation and the
Worker" (1985), Osgoode H.L.J. 203.
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must be tempered and made secondary in some instances. The problems
raised by this kind of thinking are not hard to discern:
What special interests ought to be recognized as being worthy of
protection from harm-causing profix-maximization activity? Even if one
could identify which special interests deserve this kind of treatment, how
can it be guaranteed that they will be adequately represented by the
appointment of special directors? Should the directors be put on the board
by some kind of voting or electoral system? Should the interest groups be
given something like shareholder participatory or standing rights?45 Most
of the proposals are for some kind of independent or special interest
directors: how many of these directors ought there to be? Should they be
in a majority on the board, and, more significantly, what mandate should
they have? Is each one to represent a specific interest or is he/she just to
be a director who is to have a special slant or expertise? etc.
The difficulties are compounded by the fact that the corporate
restructuring proponents seldom face the very different theoretical bases
for their proposals, often not distinguishing between the goals of abiding
by law, enhancing the shareholders' interests, internalizing costs and
developing social responsibility.
46
To concretize all of this it is useful to look at one set of proposals
which, despite its exceptional sophistication, reveals the shaky
fundaments of the corporate social responsibility movement.
Stone47 provides a scheme whereby outside directors will be appointed
to boards of major corporations as general directors, with a certain degree
of tenure. They are to be given a watching brief, evaluating the
corporation's behaviour vis-A-vis society. He also suggests that there be a
number of special directors on such boards, again with a certain
guaranteed tenure. They will be asked to monitor corporate behaviour on
behalf of special interests. Finally, he also recommends that there be some
special directors who are to keep well-known corporate transgressors in
check. In the end, confusion reigns. Take Stone's general directors. They
are to oversee and to set aright problems caused by behaviour which both
the corporation and the general public would see as unacceptable. At the
very least, this means that such directors should ensure that the
corporation abide by existing law. Indeed, Stone lists this as a principal
mandate of his general directors.48 But Stone also wants these general
45. The most frequently discussed model of participatory decision-making by non-shareholder
groups is that giving workers decision-making rights. European variants are often analysed and
scrutinized, eg., Romano, supra, note 15, at 967 etseq.
46. See Engel, supra, note 17, Romano, supra, note 17.
47. C. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York:
Harper & Row, 1975).
48. This mandate includes such things as making sure that there will be no gross financial and
inventory manipulation, overt illegal racial discrimination or breaches of the criminal law.
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directors to make sure that the corporation does not engage in legal
conduct which a broad consensus of society would find troublesome. His
illustrations include such things as the adulteration of food and beverages,
the manufacture of unsafe or shoddy products and engaging in harmful
- even if legal - environmental practices. But a determination that
something is a shoddy or unsafe product or that conduct constitutes a bad
environmental practice is an expression of opinion. For instance, given
our economic tenets, it is perfectly reasonable for a producer of a motor
car to argue that, although the product could be made safer, it might
become unmarketable because of its price or looks. This would mean that
people do not want that much safety or, in terms of the argument here,
that they are willing to accept a certain amount of shoddiness or lack of
safety.49 The underlying assumption, namely, that there is a readily
agreed upon consensus on such matters, is just plain silly. This problem
becomes even more acute when Stone lists other areas to be subjected to
the control of outside directors. His class "B" problems are issues in
respect of which it cannot be assumed that there is any coincidence
between the way the profit-maximizing corporation and the remainder of
the world perceive them. These "B" class issues include such things as
legally permitted pollution which can only be avoided by actually
incurring losses. Another troubling such issue he refers to is one where the
difficulty is that the local community needs the corporation to remain
where it is and - to avoid losses (or to increase profits) - the
corporation wants to relocate its investment. It is clear that the task of
providing special directors with anything like rational criteria in such
cases is hopeless as long as one of the dominant goals of the corporate
structure remains the maximization of profits.
Apart from the lack of criteria for decision-making which balances
special interests against profit-maximization, note that the different
special interest groups' representatives may well have competing views
on the handling of any one issue. For instance, there will be conflicts
between directors representing employees and those who are there to
look after environmental issues. On the other hand, special directors
appointed to ensure financial propriety will not likely clash with the
members of the board who are charged with profit-maximization: their
ultimate interests are congruent. Thus it is likely that some special
interests will be less well represented than others, almost by definition.
The various proposals for special directors and other such mechanisms do
not sort any of these problems out.
49. Another way of putting it is that one person's idea of "shoddy" is another person's idea of
"quality".
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The difficulties do not go away when the premise of corporate
restructuring is not that special, identifiable interests must be protected.
Proponents of nationally appointed directors to the board of corporations
do not want them to represent any particular constituency, but rather
would charge them with looking after society's common interests, the
public welfare at large. The assumption underlying such proposals has to
be that the common interests of society can be identified and defined. But,
in the absence of even such a relatively weak indicator as a legislate
expression of public wil 50, it is highly unlikely that legal profit-
maximization will not be generally perceived as being in the public
interest. Further, an even more important - and more fragile -
assumption underlies this type of proposal: it is that the corporation is an
institution whose main function is to serve the common weal directly,
rather than a facilitating instrument by which to advance the private
interests of a limited number of individuals (that is, shareholders) and
thereby only indirectly the good of society. Whatever the ancient roots of
the corporate form51 it requires a good deal of disingenuous revisionism 52
to characterize the modem corporation in this way. As we have seen,
neither popular culture, dominant economic wisdom, nor the legal
doctrines which give the corporation life (and which might be deemed to
be something of an accurate reflection of societal will), support the view
that the corporation is anything but a device to further capital
accumulation and selfish profit-maximization.
In sum, it is difficult to disagree with the devastating critique that
Milton Friedman offered of the notion of corporate social rsponsibility:
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making
maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it is? Can
self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is? Can they
decide how great a burden they are justified in placing on themselves or
their stockholders to serve the social interest? Is it tolerable that these
public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control be exercised by the
people who happen at the moment to be in charge of particular
enterprises, chosen for those posts by strictly private groups? If
businessmen are civil servants rather than the employees of their
stockholders, then in a democracy they will, sooner or later, be chosen by
the public techniques of election and appointment.53
50. The purposes of legislation are not always easily discernible. Furthermore, it is difficult to
maintain a position that a statute or some other such legal instruments represents a consensus,
rather than a political view of some constituencies which momentarily are in the ascendancy.
See generally Engel, supra, note 17.
51. See supra, notes 1-3; C. Stone, supra, note 15.
52. For such attempts, see Novak & Cooper (eds.), The Corporation: A Theological Inquiry,
supra, note 15; M. Novak, Toward a Theology of the Corporation (Washington D.C., London:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).
53. M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, supra, note 26 at 133-34.
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Similarly, Hayek argues that if an enterprise management were obliged to
abandon its role as trustee for shareholders, management's power would
become uncontrollable and "it could not be long left in the hands of
private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of increasing
public control". 54 While these very conservative political economists
view the prospect of public control of private corporations as anathema
because of their ideological starting point, they do point to the soft spot
in the corporate social responsibility movement's arguments. They
indicate that the notion of the corporation as a facilitator of the individual
drive for maximization of profits would be negated as soon as it was
sought to have it serve other functions, leading to the oppression of
investing individuals' rightful aims and desires. If corporate social
responsibility proponents would be willing to say that this does not
matter, their argument would be stronger. But, the corporate social
responsibility movement wants to have its cake and let shareholders
gorge themselves as well. It never abandons the notion that the
corporation is a useful device, both for productive activity and for profit-
making, which will lead to more capital accumulation and further profit-
making. Nonetheless, it wants to put constraints on the profit-making.
Thus, Beck has written:
Vague social issues need not be substituted for profit maximization. That
is not the issue. The issue is one of responsible profit-maximization rather
than maximum profits at all costs.... [problems] could be remedied
within a regime of responsible profit-maximization. 55 [Emphasis added]
In any event, the basic supporting argument for the corporate social
responsibility movement's proponents to the effect that corporate
managers pursue different interests than profit-maximization akeady is
open to serious doubt. There is a good deal of evidence that, in Canada,
54. Law, Legislation andLibery, supra, note 25 at 82.
55. "Corporate Power and Public Policy" in Bernier & Lajoie, Consumer Protection,
Environmental Law, and Corporate Power, vol. 50, Studies for Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, (Toronto: U. of T Press, 1985), at
181,242. Note the oxymoronic quality of the expression "responsible profit-maximization". It
well illustrates the incoherence of the corporate social responsibility movement. See also the
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendation
(Tent. draft no. 2) (A.L.I.Rev. Draft): "Managers are to be permitted [contrast being obliged
to] to qualify profit-maximization by following generally accepted principles of business ethics
[as well as to make reasonable philantropic expenditure]." In the same Draft, at page 28, the
corporation is described as: "a social institution ... whose economic goals must be constrained
by social imperatives and needs." Again, the idea is that profit-making is worthwhile, that it
can be responsible and that contemporaneously, some unspecified, unquantifiable social needs
ought to be pursued. It is this kind of vagueness which led Wedderburn, supra, note 44, to
argue that the idea that fairness could be imposed by judges was a pie-in-the-sky idea and
which led him to characterize the corporate social responsibility movement which favoured the
kind of proposals set out in the text above as the "fudge school", at 227.
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control without ownership is not as common as Berle and Means
assumed, an assumption which forms the basis for much of the
movement's argumentation 56. But, even if it is a fact of life, or at least a
significant feature of corporate organization, it may not make all that
much difference to the way that corporations are managed. That is,
although managers are not as controlled by shareholders as classical
economic and legal theory would have them be, they do behave in the
kind of profit-maximization that shareholders would wish them to do.57
All in all, there seems to be very little rational argument compelling the
conclusion that the imposition of corporate social responsibility on
corporations dovetails with the logic and viability of the corporation as
a legal and economic construct. The fact that there is such a vocal and
active movement, then, is an arresting phenomenon: if it is so easy to
show that logic does not underpin the movement, what motivates
intelligent well-meaning people to continue with their struggle for change
in the governance of corporations?
V. Reprise - The Logic of the Corporate Structure and the Impetus for
the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement
It is essential to both the Milton Friedman model and to the legal system's
precepts that the emergence of the corporate form as the main vehicle for
the conduct of market activities not be seen as anything but a facilitating
device, that is, that corporate activities continue to be characterized as the
outcomes of the expressions of the will of the individuals who
contributed the property to form the corporation. Only if this is true is it
possible to continue to talk about individuals using their resources,
abilities and capacities to maximize their opportunities, leading to the
optimal allocation of resources and the greatest amount of political
freedom. From this perspective, a corporation, no matter what its size, is
nothing but a means for the maximization of opportunities by free,
sovereign, autonomous human-beings. Managers of the corporate
property are just that: managers who have been delegated the task of
56. See text at notes 95-97.
57. R. Lamer, "Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations"
(Sept. 1966), vol. LVI American Economic Review, 777; R. Lamer, Management Control and
the Large Corporation, (New York: Dunellen, 1970); E. Herman, Corporate Control
Corporate Power (Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge U.P., 1981); M. Zeitlin,
"Corporate Ownership and Control: The Lavge Corporation and the Capitalist Class" (1974),
American Journal of Sociology, 1073; Hetherington, "When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections
on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights" (1979), 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 183 at 194. For
a particularly-penetrating analysis of why it is that managers have a permanent interest in
maximizing profits, see R.W Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture (Cambridge: Cambidge
U.P. 1977).
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obtaining the best return on the owners' investment. The maintenance of
these assumptions is complicated in the real world because the classical
free market proponents need to promote the creation and perpetuation of
large corporations, rather than small ones.
From an economic point of view, the corporate form gives advantages
for sustained market activity of a kind not readily available otherwise. In
particular, corporations permit the accumulation of capital, such
aggregates being far more flexible and potentially rewarding and
productive than the many separate small capitals of which they are made
up. This was the historical raison d'etre and justification for modem
company law; the grant of limited liability was to encourage would-be
contributors, thereby enhancing the probability of achieving accumula-
tions which would create efficiency. The second major economic
advantage bestowed by the adoption of the corporate form is that it is a
means of coordinated production, one which obviates the need for
entering into new contracts with different people every time new supplies
and services are required. A corporate organization permits many related
activities to be brought under one umbrella, lessening tansaction costs
considerably.58 Manifestly, larger corporations with their greater internal
divisions are best suited to achieve this desideratum. Yet, it is precisely the
corporations which are most likely to satisfy these goals which have been
the target of the corporate social responsibility movement's proponents.
For instance, the works of Stone, Nader and Coffee,59 concern themselves
mainly with major or large corporations. What has focussed the attention
of would-be reformers on this section of the corporate world?
What has become apparent is that large corporate actors have come to
be seen as central to our economic activity. In large part they have
contributed heavily to this image of importance, portraying themselves as
good citizens in many ways. They promote sports and culture. They say
they are proud to be Canadian citizens and that they invest for our
welfare, to make us self-sufficient, to provide jobs for Canada, to inspire
the young, to forward our research for a greater tomorrow, and so on.
The image that they offer us is that they are there to look after us. Because
of this they feel that they can claim that they need room to breathe, to
innovate and, thus, that they should be left alone by government, to be
58. Williamson argues that this is possibly the most important reason for having the corporate
structure. See "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange" (1983), 73
American Economic Review 519; "Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations" (1979), Jo. L. & Eco. 233; "Corporate Governance" (1984), 93 Yale
LJ. 1197.
59. Stone, supra, note 15; Nader, Green and Seligman, supra, note 15; Coffee, "Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective
Legal Response" (1977), 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099.
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free from unnecessary intervention. At the same time, they feel that they
are not creating too awkward a contradiction when they claim that they
are entitled to occasional governmental help; inasmuch as they are
helped, they will help make Canada a more competitive and well-off
economy. Thus it is that, like real people, they lobby, they support
policies, they participate in politics. They have made us understand that
what is good for them is good for us. Selflessness and altruism are
portrayed as the essence of their being.
This image-creation takes place in many ways. Our formal educational
system does it because, by and large, it has no quarrel with this basic
ideological message and because it is urged to do so by the corporate
sector. 60 It is part of our popular culture;6' it is encouraged by
consumerism and by advocacy advertising.62 Moreover, the managers
and owners of such corporations are treated as leaders in our nation.
They lobby as persons in respect of their own (and their corporations')
immediate causes. In addition, they are treated as influential pundits on
what is good for the economy. They participate in major decision-making
bodies' deliberations although they have never stood for election and are
in no tangible way accountable for any such activity to their shareholders.
Large corporations and their chief managers and owners make a claim
which is in effect that, because they represent what is successful in market
activity, that is, because they represent what is the essence of what we
must unquestionably accept to be a "good", they deserve special loyalty
and respect. They have fostered the idea that they acknowledge their
responsibility as socially responsible actors and that they act accordingly.
This makes it plausible to argue that, if they are perceived to fail in this
regard, intervention with corporate governance might be justified.
At the same time as the major corporations are holding themselves out
as the soul and moving spirit of modem capitalist society, some
corporations are tarnishing that image. Most corporations are very small.
It follows that these corporations do not offer the two major advantages
which justify the creation of this artificial legal person, the corporation.
Firstly, by definition, small corporations are not the aggregate of many
60. Eg., a Corporate-Higher Education Forum whose board comprises senior officers of
leading universities and blue chip corporations has been established to develop means to have
university and business interests coincide better than they do. These developments are creating
concern. See "University-Business Relationships in Research and Development; A Guide for
Universities and Researchers" in CAUT Bulletin, Nov. 1987.
61. This is all too obvious when one watches television.
62. Cloward & Piven, "The New Class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and the
Consequences" (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), at 9, estimate that "[clorporations spend
one-third of their tax-deductible advertising dollars to influence people as "citizens" rather than
just as consumers.'
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small capitals; the legal device - the corporation - which these small
capitalists use does not facilitate the accumulation of capital. Secondly,
because of their size, they are relatively incapable of insignificantly
reducing transaction costs in the way that large organizations can. In
other words, much of the business carried on by the majority of the
corporations in this country could just as easily be carried out - from an
economic perspective - by partnerships or some other contractual
arrangement between the small number of people involved. Such people
would not have limited legal liability. And here is the key: these small
corporations are formed precisely because they offer the human beings
who are members of them the opportunity to avoid some of the usual
costs of doing business, such as the costs incurred when the responsibility
for harm negligently inflicted by the business is imposed on such
individuals or when they have to pay, personally, the penalties incurred
when health and safety, or environmental standards are violated by the
business in which they engage, etc. Indeed, it is part of the popular
understanding that the adoption of the corporate form is a convenient
means by which to dodge responsibility. Clever, certainly, but not very
socially useful. Thus it is that the large corporations' claim that they
deserve respect and should be left as unregulated as possible because of
their utility to the economy and their established sense of social
responsibility is spoilt by the fact that a huge number of organizations -
which have the same legal form but which are much smaller in size -
are seen to serve no socially useful purpose. This damages the image of
corporations in general. In addition, because the law which seeks to
develop the protection of shareholder interests has evolved in respect of
the smaller, more controlled organization, it is not very well-suited to
regulate mega-corporations where this problem is so quantitavely
different that it has become qualitatively different.63 These departures
63. Here note that the traditional corporate law case books in Canada do not differentiate
between Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1987] A.C. 22, - type corporations and the giant
Exxon type. Yet, a quick glance through the table of cases in a standard student text book, such
as Beck, Getz, lacobucci and Johnston Business Associations Casebook (Toronto: Richard De
Boo, 1987), shows that only a very few of the corporations found in the list of the thousand
leading corporations compiled by the Globe and Mail's Report on Business Magazine in 1984,
1985 and 1986, appear as litigants in the cases examined. As far as I know, in Canada only
the local edition of Hadden, (Hadden, Forbes, Simmons - Canadia Business Organizations
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984)), treats small and large corporations separately. There is an
irony in this because it is, of course, precisely these kinds of corporations which correspond best
to the classical economist assumption that the corporate form is merely a device which permits
individuals who own property to maximize their opportunities and to achieve their desires.
Moreover, it is this very type of corporation which has provided the stuff from which corporate
law is fashioned. After all, the corporation in Salomon v. Salomon & Co., the case which is the
corner-stone of the law relating to the legal personality of corporations, (and in a way,
therefore, which lays the basis for the argument that the claims for citizenry and political rights,
386 The Dalhousie Law Journal
from the ideal-type corporation, both in respect of the kind of
corporation and in respect of the utility of extant law, has freed would-
be reformists to argue for changes in the legal governance of corporations.
In addition, large corporations' positive image-creation efforts are
undermined in two significant ways by their own conduct.
First of all they commit crimes. They do so remarkably frequently.
Regrettably, as Ellis records, "governments in Canada, federal, provincial
and municipal, are not willing to devote resources to collecting systematic
information on corporate crime. This means we in Canada have
information on only a small fraction of various "tips" of the total
corporate crime iceberg." 64 As a consequence, Ellis argues, there is much
more corporate crime than most Canadians, governmental agencies and
professional scholars acknowledge. The isue has been studied much more
extensively in the United States65. As early as 1940, Sutherland, in his
study of seventy major corporations, found that they frequently broke the
law, indeed so often that, if they had been merely mortal beings, their
recidivism would have caused them to have been treated as habitual
criminals.66 All studies since that time have come to the same conclusion.
The most recent of them, that of Clinard and Yeager,67 found that 40
percent of the Fortune 500 did not commit crimes of any kind. 60
percent did. While many of the deviations are merely infractions of
technical regulations, not unlike the violation of a parking by-law and
often do not cause much more damage, many of the infractions cause
serious harm and excite moral outrage. In terms of cost, the estimates of
the adverse effects of corporate wrongdoing are mindboggling. Thus, in
1974, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reported that the cost of white-
collar crime (which was defined very conservatively by it, as befitted an
organization of its kind) was just under $U.S. 42 billion annually. This
was ten times the total amount taken in all thefts reported in the FB.I.
which major corporations make, are legitimate) was not a giant corporation; it was neither a
complicated multi-member organization, nor one in which management and control were split.
While the point cannot be pursued here, it is intriguing that corporate law doctrine has
developed in the sphere which most closely models the idealized market situation but in which
the market advantages sought by the incorporation device are not attainable.
64. Desmond Ellis, The Wrong Stuff- An Introduction to the Sociological Study of Deviance
(Toronto: Collier MacMillan, 1987), at 89.
65. As major corporations in Canada are often subsidiaries of major corporations in the
United States, the American indicators are useful to analysis of the Canadian situation. In any
event, there is no doubt that corporate culture is much the same in our two countries.
66. "White Collar Criminality" (1940), 5 An. Soc. Rev. 1; "Crime and Business' (1941), 217
Annals 112.
67. Corporate Crime, (New York: The Free Press, 1980).
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index, and 250 times the amount taken in all bank robberies in the U.S.
in that year.68
More telling, perhaps, than the incidents of criminality of large
corporations is the actual nature of the deviant conduct engaged in. For
instance, major corporations have been parties to spectacular price fixing
schemes and anti-competitive practices. The heavy equipment electrical
conspiracy involving General Electric,69 the predatory pricing practices of
Hoffman-La Roche in Canada (which revealed the many other anti-
competitive practices of this corporation in all parts of the world),70 the
folding carton conspiracy7 , are just a few of the many recent examples.
In America, attention was focussed on the use of bribes by top
corporations such as Exxon, Lockheed and MacDonnell-Douglas. 72
Deceptive advertising is so rife that we have come to talk about
permissible puffery as opposed to unacceptable straight-forward lying.
Some social commentators are arguing that the result of such continuous
telling of half-truths has made the population quite cynical and less
truthful than it used to be.73 The number of manufacturing enterprises
which have knowingly put shoddy and dangerous products on the
market, leading to serious injuries and deaths are very well-known. They
include Ford's production of the Pinto74, the car which exploded on
touch, the thalidomide tragedy and the Dalkon shield saga.75 In all of
these better known cases it turned out that the producers knew, or could
easily have known, of the defects and frequently hid their knowledge
from the unwary public. The discharge of dangerous toxic materials, such
68. A Handbook on White-Collar Crime (1974); see also Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and
the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal Justice, (New York: John Wiley & Sons
1979) at 106; Clinard and Yeager, supra, note 67; Taskforce Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Crime and its Impact - An
Assessment (1967); Conklin, "llegal But Not Criminal" Business Crime in America,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Box, Power, Crime and Mystification (London:
Tavistock Publications, 1983).
69. For a discussion of the main elements of this crime, see G. Geis, "The Heavy Electrical
Equipment Anti-Trust Cases of 1961", in Clinard & Quinney (eds.), Criminal Behaviour
Systems, (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1967).
70. R. v. Hoffman-La Roche Limited (No. 2) (1980), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 563 (Ont. H. Ct.). For
a discussion of some of Hoffman-La Roche's dubious practices, see J. Braithwaite, Corporate
Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (London, Boston, Melbourne & Henley: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984).
71. See. Clinard & Yeager, supra, note 64.
72. For the story of these bribery cases, see B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicify
on Corporate Offenders (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), Chapters 13, 14.
73. D. Boorstin, The Image (Pelican, 1962), at 216-17.
74. For a short description, see Fisse & Braithwaite, supra, note 72, Chapter 5.
75. See Mintz, AtAny Cost (New York: Pantheon, 1985).
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as mercury into the English-Wabigon River Basin 76, the burial of toxic
waste at places like Love Canal, are among the better known practices
involving the infliction of environmental and personal harm by major
corporations which knew, or could have known, of the harm that they
were likely to create.
Again, more and more the public is becoming aware of major
corporations having used processes and toxic substances in the workplace
with knowledge, or easily obtainable knowledge, of the harm that they
were likely to cause to workers. The asbestos industry is well-known for
its outrageous conduct in this regard77; so also are the operations of plastic
producers who exposed workers to vinyl chloride78 or manufacturers
who callously exposed their workers to cyanide.79 We have heard, all too
often, of corporations who know full well that the production of certain
substances and release thereof on the market is not an acceptable practice
in a civilized society, yet continue to make these substances to put them
on foreign markets where people either do not know of the danger or
have much less stringent regulation"0. In this context, it is to be noted that
major corporations are often involved in practices which, while not
actually illegal, are, to their knowledge, of dubious acceptability. The
earlier mentioned marketing of the infant formula milk in countries
where this presents a danger because it requires mixing the product with
contaminated water is a sad example. The lack of respect for the lives of
people in jurisdictions where there is less control over corporate activities
than there is in this part of the world has also brought a great deal of
shame to the defenders of western capitalistic activities. Again, examples
are all to plentiful: Bhophal is but one; asbestos manufacturers actually let
young children play in the mountains of their poisonous material in
South Africa, knowing full well that no such contact would be permitted
in the country of origin of the corporation".
The image this kind of activity offers is not that which is sought to be
purveyed by the corporate sector. Moreover, the task of selling the idea
that large corporations are the guardians and promoters of the common
76. For a telling of this tale, see Troyer, No Safe Place (Toronto, Vancouver:. Clarke, Irwin &
Co., 1977).
77. Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1985).
78. Brody, "Vinyl Chloride Party Knew of Dangers to Workers", New York Times, 11 May
1974.
79. For a discussion of this incident, see Glasbeek, "The Importance of Golub: why the
criminal law should be used in resepct of certain occupational health and safety violations"
(1986), Vol. IX, #5, At the Centre, at 19.
80. J. Braithwaite, supra, note 70.
81. See Brodeur, supra, note 77.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement
good is made harder because, very often, the corporations which have
engaged in the ugly kinds of practices listed above are not very seriously
punished for these transgressions. For instance, for its part in the heavy
electrical equipment fraud, General Electric was fined $437,000. That
amounted to the equivalent of the imposition of a fine of $12.30 on a
person earning $15,000 annually. 82 In the folding carton industry
conspiracy, in which each of twenty-three conspirators were initially
fined $50,000 (some fines were later reduced), the fines amounted to the
imposition of fines ranging from the equivalent of 24 cents to $1.80 for
a person making $15,000 per year.83 Similarly, very small fines were
imposed on the First National Bank of Boston and Shawmut for
laundering satchels of $20 bills (allegedly brought in by underworld
figures) in clear violation of the law, the amount laundered being $1.3
billion. 84. Hoffman-La Roche was fined $50,000 for its wilful
infringement of the predatory pricing provisions of the Combines
Investigation Act, 85 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation which, in the period
1970-75, had paid out between $30 and $38 million in questionable
payments (bribes) to such governments as those of Japan, Germany, The
Netherlands, Italy, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and to such eminent
persons as Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan and Prince Bernhard of The
Netherlands, to win sales, agreed to pay a fine of $647,000. The
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation was also involved in paying bribes in
order to obtain contracts, although the amounts were of a lesser order.
The eventual fines paid by that corporation amounted to $55,000 in
addition to an agreement to pay $1.2 million in settlement of a civil suit
brought against it by the U.S. government which had incurred expenses
as result of the frauds practised by the corporation.86 In a similar way,
Stanbury has recorded that fines imposed under the Combines
Investigation Ac4 for what the courts claimed to be very serious offences,
were derisory. Typically they were the equivalent of imposing penalties of
$131 on a person earning $15,000 per year.87
82. See Geis "Criminal Penalties for Corporate Offenders" (1972), 8 Criminal Law Bulletin,
377.
83. Clinard & Yeager, supra, note 64, Box supra, note 65.
84. The New York Times, 9 June, 1985.
85. Supra, note 70.
86. See Fisse & Braithwaite, supra, note 72.
87. See Stanbury, "Penalties and Remedies Under the Combines Investigation Act 1899-
1976" (1976), 14 O.H.L.J. 571. Stanbury argued, at page 571, that "with very few exceptions,
the penalties in combines cases have been grossly inadequate for the purpose either of deterring
the repetition of the offence or deterring others who may contemplate similar illegal restraints
of trade. In fact, a careful review of the fines in such cases would almost certainly result in a
conclusion that 'crime pays'."
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Even when the conviction is the rare one of criminal conspiracy under
the aegis of the morally more significant Criminal Code, the fines on
corporations tend to be light. Thus in R. v. McNamara et al (no.2)
88
corporations, which had been convicted of seven counts, were fined a
total of $6,000,050. The amount of which the government of Canada
had been defrauded by the corporations so punished was said to be
$4,279,000. But, that amount was calculated by reference only to the
seven counts in the final indictment. There was evidence before the court
that conduct of a similar kind had been engaged in by these corporations
in forty other situations, covering a period of an additional 14 years. In
occupational health and safety and environmental situations, also, the
penalties have been startlingly light 89.
When corporate conduct leads to a successful prosecution, punishment
is usually imposed upon the corporation, not upon those managers who
made the decisions which led to the offence and never on major
shareholders or controlling owners as such.90 This furthers the impression
that the legal device, the corporation, created to further the economic
aims of accumulation of capital and the diminution of transaction costs,
is actually a convenient way of avoiding responsibility for wanton and
unacceptable conduct, a view which is bolstered by the use made of the
corporate form by small business to avoid the incidence of many social
and legal obligations.
While Sutherland made his observations in the 1940s, 91 attention on
88. (1981), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 516 (Ont. C.A.)
89. Take for example the enforcement of the occupational health and safety legislation in
Ontario. Corporations are frequently fined a few hundred or a few thousand dollars for
violations which lead to the death of workers; see eg., R. v. Ontario Gypsum Co. Ltd (1982),
C.C.H. Empt. Safety and Health Guide, para. 95, 191, where the corporation was fined $1,500
and a supervisor $500 for such a violation. The uproar which has arisen over recent times has
led to an upward trend; in R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287, a fine of $12,000
was imposed for a violation which led to the death of a worker. Moreover, agencies under
pressure as public attention has been brought to bear on the lightness of the fines for such
serious consequences of avoidance of the law, have loudly trumpeted their intent to enforce
regulations more stringently and to impose much heavier fines. Of course, as experience has
shown us, merely to increase maxima does not lead either to more stringent enforcement or to
more severe penalties.
90. Occasionally, individuals are prosecuted for their offences as was the case in the
MacNamara decision, supra, note 88, but there, the penalties were still disproportionately light.
Mr. MacNamara and Mr. Cooper, two of the chief wrongdoers were sentenced to serious jail
sentences but were given very early parole, leading to the expression of righteous indignation
by editorial writers. See "Privileged Parole", Globe & Mail, 28 April, 1982. For a full
discussion as to why it is that the corporations are sought to be made responsible rather than
the managers and/or the shareholders, see H. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance Is Not
Treated as a Crime - The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984), 22 O.H.L.J. 393.
91. "White Collar Criminality" (1940), 5 An. Soc. Rev. 1; "Crime and Business" (1941), 217
Annals 112; "Is 'White Collar Crime' Crime?" (1945), 10 An. Soc. Rev. 132; White Collar
Crime, (New York: Dryden, 1949).
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the kind of wayward corporate behaviour set out above seems to have
intensified in the last ten to fifteen years. It may be, of course, that there
has been an increase in deviant corporate behaviour, but this is
problematic. A number of more compelling reasons for the augmented
notoriety of wrongful corporate behaviour suggest themselves.
During the activist 1960s, when the North American economy was
doing so well, the growth of public interest activity, especially in relation
to consumer protection, was quite remarkable. It made sense that, in this
climate of unparalleled abundance, manifesting conspicuous consump-
tion, deficiencies relating to consumerism would become the focus of
attention. This movement had the greatest impetus where capitalism and
consumerism were truly a way of life, that is, in the United States. But it
was followed very quickly by similar developments in Canada.
Legislative consumer reform, improved environmental and occupational
health and safety statutes became the vogue.92 Thus it was that, at the
same time as corporations could claim with some justification that they
were the engine of growth and, therefore, what was good for them was
good for all of society, they were, because of these very claims, the focus
of legislative amelioration of the neighbourhood effects of private
economic activities. Ralph Nader, in his famous battles with General
Motors, was one of the more important activists in identifying the
corporate sector as being a centre of harm-causing activities. Awareness
increased in the United States during the Vietnam War, where such
famous companies as General Motors, General Dynamics and Chrysler
were seen to making large profits from a very controversial war. Even
more provoking was the fact that companies like Dow Chemical were
making profits out of such horrible activities as napalm bombing.
This growing unease about the downside effect of large corporations'
activities did not diminish with time. As the awareness of environmental
harm done by corporations (acid rain, Three Mile Island, Love Canal)
occupational harm (asbestos, mercury, lead), bad products, (thalidomide,
Pinto) grew, the economy began to falter. Inflation and unemployment
came to dominate public consciousness; high interest rates made
consumerism more a dream than a reality. Corporations which had
joyfully claimed full responsibility for the previous state of abundance
sought to avoid being blamed for these disturbing new trends. They
blamed foreigners (OPEC) for the decline of business, as well as unions
92. See, Belobaba, "The Development of Consumer Protection Regulation: 1945-1984" in
Consumer Protection, Environmental Law and Corporate Power, supra, note 55; the same
volume also contains an essay by P. Emond on the legislative development in the
environmental sector, "Environmental Law and Policy: A Retrospective Examination of the
Canadian Experience", at 89.
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because they impeded productive and competitive practices. But, most of
all, they blamed government. The allegation was (is) that its increasing
intervention in the market had distorted it to such an extent that it was
becoming uncompetitive and unproductive. This argument had many
aspects (printing too many dollars, creating disincentives for foreign
investors, spending too much on welfare) but, in the context of this paper,
the most important one was the rather successful corporate sector's attack
on the state-imposed (that is, non-market created) standards of behaviour
relating to the environment, occupational health and safety and product
manufacturing.
While the corporate sector appears to have been quite successful in its
efforts to create a widely held perception of government ineptitude,
wastefulness and authoritarianism, 93 it does not follow that the
corporations have shedded the image of being dangerous inflictors of
harm on society.
From about 1980 onwards attention has been drawn to the staggering
incidents of insider trading, especially in the U.S.A., the most notorious
incident involving I. Boesky. By April 1986, 46 such charges had been
laid in the state of New York alone.94 Given all this, the public's trust in
corporate management is very low and declining. By 1978, a poll found
that, over a nine year period, the number of people who expressed a great
deal of confidence in the heads of large corporations in the U.S.A.
dropped from 55 per cent to 15 per cent.95 More recently, a New York
Times/CBS News Poll revealed that only 32 per cent of the American
public think most corporate executives are honest, while 55 per cent
think most are not.96 The corporate sector has become alarmed by this
public mistrust. While it thinks it is largely misplaced, it emphasises the
need for the corporate sector to reform itself, lest external forces do it for
it. Thus, at a conference called to discuss the television media's finding
that business had a bad image, the Business Roundtable (an umbrella
group which represents the largest 200 U.S. corporations) released a
survey done for it which showed that high school students who were
93. I presume that this is what is meant by the conventional wisdom that there is a
contemporary lack of appetite for government intervention and a popular demand for
returning the economy to the total control of the private sector.
94. New York Tmes, 27 April, 1986.
95. A poll conducted by Harris, cited in Silk & Vogel, Ethics and Profits, (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1976).
96. New York lImes, 9 June, 1985. The same poll found that 54% of the public thought white
collar crime went on too often, 85% thought that the criminals got away with such crimes and
65% said that those punished got off too lightly. This underscores the importance of the events
stressed in the text to public perception.
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asked whether business executives would be very or somewhat likely to
take certain actions gave the following responses:
... 85% said business people would seek profit from "insider trading" in
the company's stock; 74% said business people would spread lies and
rumours which could damage competitors; 74% said business people
would faslify the company's earnings and financial statements; 68% said
business people would secretly dump toxic chemicals or waste rather than
render them harmless in order to save money; 62% said business people
would resort to blackmail; 63% said business people would sabotage a
competitors facilities or products in order to eliminate competition; 52%
said business people would engage in illegal drug dealing to turn quick
profits; 37 % said business people would produce defective, potentially
harmful products and knowingly sell them on the market; 17% said
business people would plan the injury, or even murder, of an employee
who "knows too much"; 13% said business people would plan the injury,
or even murder of a competitor.97
As Variety reported, the research led to heated exchanges as to how
television and business could get together to improve this image.
In short, despite the corporate sector's best efforts, the corporate social
responsibility movement has a fertile political field in which to plant its
seed.
VI. Corporate Power
Most of the manifestations of wrongful corporate behaviour are the
results of a clear violation of existing legal standards and/or failure to
internalize costs to the appropriate productive enterprise. In theory, this
could be taken care of by the existing legal system without requiring any
changes in corporate governance. After all, individuals could bring
private actions; the state's regulatory agency could set more clearly
defined standards and streamline its enforcement processes; the criminal
law could be used to repress the more immoral and serious deviants.
Inasmuch as all of this is theoretically possible, it would have been more
logical to expect an argument that the existing legal mechanisms ought to
be refined and used so as to contain wrongful corporate behaviour, rather
than to seek to change the structure of something which makes economic
and legal sense. We have now come to the crux of the matter: the
corporate social responsibility movement is posited on the notion that the
existing legal mechanisms simply cannot be made to work to control
97. As reported in Variety, June 10, 1987. The high school students may have got their
impressions from the television portrayal of the corporate sector (from "Dallas", "Dynasty",
etc.), and the picture is thus not representative of more mature judgments. But it is the
perception which counts in this battle for primacy and autonomy. Otherwise why would the
corporate sector worry about such uninformed opinions?
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large corporations. This conclusion rests, in large part,98 on the fact that
our normal legal mechanisms will be ineffective because of the
importance of the private sector to governments, in particular, the
importance of a small number of corporate actors to the government. It
is the fact that an economy, such as Canada's, is dominated by a
relatively small number of corporations which is the substratum of all the
arguments advocating the creation of an invigorated regime of corporate
social responsibility.
There are hundreds of thousands of corporations and businesses in
Canada.99 From the point of view of the ideal market theorists, the more
the better: competition is sharpened and political freedom is enhanced.
Moreover, each of the many market actors is pursuing her/his/its
individual objectives. The ensuing fragmentation guarantees that
competing interest groups will be on more or less equal terms and that
none of them will be able to achieve a decisive economic or political
advantage in the competition for economic markets and/or political
influence' t1 But, of course, this is not how Canada's economy works.
The fact is that a few dominant corporations control the economy. Here
I do not want to enter into the controversy as to whether or not there is
too much corporate concentration in Canada. That there is a great deal
of concentration cannot be denied. The well-known Bryce Report0'
concluded that the evidence before it suggested concentration in Canada
was higher than in any other industrial country but, in the end, found this
to be an acceptable state of affairs.102 There is a controversy because the
comparison of levels of concentration is a problematic exercise. For
instance, one has to allow for the different number of businesses in the
98. 1 say "in large part" because in small part it rests on the fact that some members of the
corporate social responsibility movement would like the corporations to be more altruistic
citizens, in the same way that they believe all citizens ought to be more altruistic, that is, they
are assuming a corporatist model of society, one in which unity, rather than competition and
conflict, is the norm.
99. Hadden, Forbes, Simmonds, Canadian Business Organizations Law, supra, note 63, rely
on a report of the Small Business Secretariat of the Department of Industry, Trade and
Commerce, New Statistics on SmallBusinesses in Canada (Ottawa, 1979), to show that, when
225,000 unincorporated enterprises with sales revenue of less than $10,000 were omitted, there
were still some 650,000 active enterprises in Canada in 1976.
100. R. Mileband, The State in Capitalist Society, (London: Quartet Books, 1977), has argued,
most convincingly, that this notion that the operation of a free market leads to a level political
and economic playing field is precisely what is wrong with pluralist democratic theories.
101. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, R. Bryce,
Chairman (Bryce Report), (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978).
102. At page 42. The Commission believed that, for Canada to be efficient in world markets,
concentration, rather than cut throat competition, was to be promoted. Whatever the merits of
this argument, it requires a departure from the notion of efficiency based on the ideal market
model of the Friedman type, the one on which all the arguments which support the legitimacy
of the corporate structure rely.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement
countries being compared, as well as the different ways of characterizing
the control of assets. 103 What is signiticant here is that a few major
corporations control the major sectors of our economy. Thus, in
agriculture, 0.06% of the number of corporations have 8.17% of the total
assets, 13.84% of the equity, 4.74% of the sales and 10.37% of the profits
in the agricultural industries; in mining, 5.12% of the corporations control
91.74% of the asets, 91.25% of the equity, have 91.28% of the sales and
make 98.70% of the profits; in manufacturing, 1.92% of the corporations
have 79.29% of the assets, 83.58% of the equity, make 72.89% of the sales
and 76.79% of the profits; in construction, 0.12% of the corporations have
22.57% of the assets, 24.13% of the equity, make 14.03% of the sales and
20.12% of the profits; in utilities, 0.89% of the corporations have 94.09%
of the assets, 94.30% of the equity, make 78.81% of the sales and 88.17%
of the profits; in wholesale trade, 0.54% of the corporations have 51.09%
of the assets, 60.77% of the equity, make 43.54% of the sales and 39.38%
of the profits; in retail, 0.11% of the corporations have 41.05% of the
assets, 53.43% of the equity, make 33.59% of the sales and 52.46% of the
profits; in services 0.13% of the corporations have 3.64% of the assets,
34.89% of the equity, make 23.58% of the sales and 43.38% of the
profits.104
In an economy ideologically and practically committed to the
production of economic welfare by placing reliance on the private
ordering system, the behaviour of private economic actors is crucial. As
Beck'05 has written:
In a private enterprise market system, such critical matters as the
distribution of income, what is produced, the allocation of resources to
different lines of production, the allocation of the labour force to different
occupations and work places, plant locations, investment levels, the
technologies used in production, the quality of goods and services, and the
innovation of new products are all matters that are in large part decided
by business men. Yet they are also matters of great economic and social
significance. They are, in a real sense, public policy decisions and, to the
extent that they are made or shaped by business leaders, such leaders
exercise a public policy function.
103. Hadden, et. al., supra, note 63, at 53-57.
104. Compiled from Statistics Canada, C.A.L U.RA. Report for 1984, Part I - Corporations.
The same report also reveals the following information. The leading 500 non-financial actors
have 54.0% of sale, 67.7% of assets, 70.4% of profits. There are 1,905 large non-financial
corporations with assets of $25 million dollars or more. They account for 73.3% of assets,
55.5% of sales, 72.6% of profits. Calculating another way, the Report looks at enterprises. An
enterprise is a group of corporations under a controlling interest. The 100 leading enterprises
in Canada comprise some 1,300 corporations. They account for 38.9% of sales, 52.1% of assets,
54.4% of equity, 53.4% of profits, 41.7% of taxable income.
105. "Corporate Power and Public Policy", supra, note 55 at 182.
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In a fragmented economy, private decision-makers pursuing their
many different goals, would not, of course, exercise undue influence.
Where there are a few large economic units who dominate various
segments, however, they have the potential to wield enormous public
power. Beck, again:
If it is largely left to private enterprise to make the critical public policy
decisions ... government policy must ensure the success of private
enterprise. To fail to do so is to risk detrimental effects on the economy
and thus on the citizenry whose welfare is the chief function of
government to advance .... Government must, to a significant degree, be
acquiescent to the needs and demands of business for to do so is to do no
more than to provide good government.
16
Yet, it is not obvious how even dominant economic units will influence
government. After all, their interests are not always the same and, in any
event, what mechanisms do they have to let the state understand what
their wishes are? That is, inasmuch as there is fragmentation, pluralism
will persist and the autonomy of elected government be preserved. But,
the idea that large corporations are just yet another interest group is a
pluralist society competing for attention and influence with similarly
placed groups is a distortion of the Canadian reality. Consider:
(i) Managerial, as opposed to shareholder, control of dominant firms is
not as well established in Canada as the Berle and Means analysis
suggests is the case in the U.S.A. Francis 07 has shown that Canada's
32 wealthiest families, along with five conglomerates, control about
one-third of the country's non-financial assets. The revenues of their
various enterprises, in 1985, were nearly $123 billion. This
outstripped the federal government's income in that year: it was
only $80 billion. Similarly, it has been calculated that 9 families
control 50 per cent of the equity on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 08
Moreover, a 1984 Toronto Stock Exchange study showed that, of
the 283 public companies which make up the composite index,
close to 80 per cent of these listed companies are controlled by a
single family and/or group. Only 21 per cent were widely held, that
is, the shareholders were so dispersed as to give managers real
control. 109 In Canada, therefore, it is difficult to speak of ownership
without control. In this context, it is easier to see how the business
interests of a few dominant Canadian corporations and of their
106. Id., at 184.
107. ControllingInterests: Who Owns Canada?, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1986).
108. Beck, supra, note 55 at 197. Note that the banks are not included in that figure.
109. "The Regulation of Take-Over Bids in Canada: Premium Private Agreement
Transactions" in Report of the Security Industry Committee on Take-Over Bids (1983). In the
United States 85.2% of the companies are widely held.
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owners may both coincide and be easily transmitted to policy-
makers.
(ii) Clement has shown that there is an extensive system of interlocking
directorships connecting the major corporations in Canada. Of the
113 dominant corporations he found 1848 interlocked positions.11u
Again, this makes it easier for business leaders to develop congruent
views if they wish to do so in order to influence the state and to put
up a reasonably united front when they want to do so.
(iii) Not only are major corporations and their chief executives closely
interlinked, they also have very close direct links with the state. A
recent study by Fox and Ornstein"' revealed the overlapping
memberships of public and private organizations. By overlapping
memberships they mean ties created by individuals who move from
one organization to another in the course of their careers, or who
have held concurrent membership in more than one organization.
The organizations considered were private and public sector
organizations, that is, businesses and state institutions. They found
that more than 3,300 such ties connected the 148 state organizations
and 302 private organizations surveyed. This study also showed that
a great number of politicans and bureaucrats became members of
the corporate 6ite or had been recruited from those segments. For
instance, 17.9 per cent of federal cabinet ministers had held, or came
to hold, corporate organizational positions. About 20 per cent of the
federal cabinet, members of the senate, judges in the two senior
courts, and university and hospital boards, have held at least one
corporate position, either before or after their membership in the
state institution.
(iv) Newspapers and other media are private corporations whose
managerial and major shareholding groups frequently have very
important interests in other dominant corporate groupings. Thus,
Clement showed that the 15 dominant media firms were run by 105
major owners, directors and managers. Of these, 51 were also
members of the ruling 6ite (as defined by Clement) of the country
at large, that is, they were also directors or executives of one of more
of the boards of the nation's 113 dominant firms. This, of course,
has a tremendous effect on the potential ability of large business
interests to make their views known to governments and to
pursuade them. Beck has shown that when issues have really
110. The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975) at 155.
111. "The Canadian State and Corporate Elites in the Post-War Period" (1986), 23 Canadian
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 48.
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mattered to large business, such as the government's policies in
respect of the National Energy Programme, The Foreign Investment
Review Act, the creation of Petro-Canada and its purchases of
private oil companies, the purchase by the Ontario government of
interests in Suncor, the findings and treatment of a Royal
Commission of Inquiry into the Newspaper Industries, the debates
concerning Canada's general competitive policies and an attempt at
a radical reformation of taxation law, major business interests were
able to have their views almost totally reflected by the news media.
Inevitably, those interests held sway with the government of the
day. 2
(v) As well as using all these links to lobby government directly and
have their views heard1 13, there are a great number of trade and
industry associations in which the divergent interests of firms in the
same economic sectors are brought together. Inevitably they tend to
be controlled by the larger corporations. These powerful lobbying
groups - aided by the personal connections of their members with
government - are able to gain a great deal of access to government.
Recently, the Business Council on National Issues (modelled on the
U.S. Business Roundtable), 1 4 comprised by the chief executive
officer of truly major corporations has given coherence and
direction to the politics of business. 15
There is little doubt, then, that a government which perceives itself as
being reliant upon the private sector to provide economic and social
welfare, is in a position to be influenced, constrained and even
intimidated by a closely connected and single-minded business 61ite. That
single-mindedness will exist in respect of particular issues'1 6 or in respect
112. Beck, supra, note 55 at 183-193 and sources cited there.
113. Hugh G. Thorburn, "Pressure Groups", vol. Pat-Z, The Canadian Encyclopaedia, at
1472 notes that over 50% of 703 Canadian firms studied in 1978 had been in contact with the
federal political 6lite and bureaucrats; 42% had made individual representations to federal
government department, boards and commissions; 55% of large firms (that is, firms with over
500 employees) had made individual representations to government, whereas 28% of small
firms had done so.
114. Text at note 97, supra.
115. This is a paraphrase of the thought conveyed by Useem in his The Inner Circle: Large
Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the US. and UK. (New York:
Oxford U.P. 1984). Other powerful lobby groups in Canada include the Canadian Tax
Foundation, commercial banks, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, Canadian Medical
Association, Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Institute of
Associate Executives (a lobby of lobbyists), etc. Note also that non-business groups have such
lobby groups but that they are much smaller and much less influential, in part because the
organizational ties of the Fox/Omstein variety hardly exist. A prominent example would be
the public interest advocacy centre, Energy Probe.
116. Such as, say, the N.E.P. or the Foreign Investment Review Act
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of the general direction of the economy, for instance, in respect of issues
such as deregulation, subsidies for certain kinds of economic
undertakings, attracting foreign investment, undermining the welfare
system with its costs to business, containing trade unions' demands, etc.
Eventually, what the dominant economic units, intimate to government
is that, if the appropriate economic and political climate is not created by
it, they will lose "confidence". That is, the threat of deinvestment looms
large.117
This being so, we now have an explanation as to why it is that the
corporate sector can impose, so frequently, the costs of its profit-making
activities on society with relative impunity. Standard-setters are
restrained, lest they impose too high a burden on that segment of the
economy whose withdrawal would bode ill for the economic welfare of
society and, therefore, for the government of the day. Again, the relative
pusillanimity of enforcement strategies and the derisory nature of the
penalties imposed can now be understood. Moreover, it becomes
absolutely clear why the corporate social responsibility movement, at the
end of the day, basically defines corporate social responsibility as a
requirement that corporations abide by existing standards: to impose
altruistic goals on this autonomous private sector is out of the question,
given the underpinnings of the Canadian capitalist liberal democracy set
out above.
I am now in a better position to answer the question I posed: why does
the corporate social responsibility movement offer the proposals it does?
In a democracy, elected government is to set the standards and norms
for economic and social behaviour. In our democracy, the profit-
maximization by individual economic actors is accepted by government
to be the motor of our economy. In an economy with many independent,
unrelated economic actors, this should leave government free to set
standards and norms. The problem is that the Canadian economy is not
of that kind. Democratic control has to be subjugated to large private
interests which can determine the level of economic activity and general
welfare. The corporate social responsibility movement does not want to
accept the logical implications which flow from this analysis. After all,
logic would dictate that, at a minimum, dominance of the economy, and
thus of the State, by a few corporations should be eliminated. Amongst
117. This is recognized by the more thoughtful supporters of market systems as political
economic regimes. Eg., C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977)
writes at 88: "[Market systems help support liberal democracy" but because "major decisions
are made in the market rather than in government, the tasks of government are complicated
and the powers of government in some ways crippled. The more major decisions are made by
a decreasing number of market actors, the greater the fetters on government.
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the corporate social responsibility movement proponents, only Nader and
Green have proffered a suggestion to this effect - they ask for the break-
up of some oligopolies. 18 Others'1 9 have made but the vaguest of
references to this possibility. Yet, in the ideal, to recapture democratic
control over the state, a curtailment of existing economic power is
imperative. The power of the non-61ite members of society to participate
in politics and in economics should be increased dramatically. The
corporate social responsibility movement does not advocate that. The
proposals made for new kinds of corporate governance are clearly aimed
at changing the consciousness of the ruling class cadres, rather than at
attacking the institutions and mechanisms which permit the ruling classes
to perpetuate their power. To elaborate: the various constituencies
(workers, consumers, even government) are to have representatives on
boards of directors to help generate a form of commitment from
corporate management to develop and to support socially responsible
corporate behaviour. These representatives, however, are to continue to
act in a setting where they are to participate in the promotion of profit-
earning, albeit only responsibleprofit-earning. Some of the difficulties for
representatives who are to be put in this position have already been
outlined. Note further that, inasmuch as governments are to appoint
directors or to have their own representatives on corporate boards, it is to
be remembered that the genesis of the concern is the unchecked wayward
behaviour of corporations, unchecked because government is already
beholden to the corporate 6lite and does not try to inhibit its excesses
with any zest. How likely is it that government-appointed directors will
be inclined to follow a new independent path? In a similar vein, note that
another recommended idea120 is that think-tanks be set up which include
working class, consumer, health and safety activists, environmentalists
and other such sectoral interest representataives. The idea is that this will
stiffen government's back by providing a counter-weight to business
interests at the lobbying tables. Again, it is hard to see how governments
which have been penetrated by dominant business interests and which
are ideologically committed to the perpetuation of the existing
relationships, could set up effective mechanisms of this kind.
In short, the problem is one of too little democracy. Democratic
control over the allocation of resources and individual freedoms is
entrusted, in theory, to a state which is electorally responsible to the
citizenry made up of juristically equal citizens. It turns out that the state's
118. Taming the Corporate Giant, supra, note 15.
119. Eg., Beck, supra, note 55.
120. Id
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sovereignity is diminished because governments must, in the first place,
respond to the needs of dominant economic actors. The problem
becomes one of too little democracy, too little citizenry control over
essential conditions because large private economic interests crowd them
out of the political decision-making processes. This becomes obvious and,
therefore, potentially dangerous to those who exercise power, because the
large private economic actors who are in a position to ride roughshod
over the majority's interests, frequently violating shared moral precepts
and existing legal norms, all too often take advantage of their position.
Yet the corporate social responsibility movement response is a set of
proposals for attenuated democracy. Nothing is done, directly, for
enhancing ruled class participating in government decision-making.
Nothing is to be done, directly, to make the ruling class' instruments -
corporations commanding the economic heights - less important to the
state. Rather, they will be asked to take special interest-group
representation into account to some undefined extent. The proposals are
really mechanisms for technocratic input - contrast participatory-
democratic - input. Each representative voice is to be but one amongst
many. The model of representation is one which mirrors that of
conventional liberalism in that it assumes that the representors are not
there as class representatives. Consumers, workers, environmentalists,
etc., are all perceived to have differing, perhaps conflicting, interests. This
assumption of sectorialness is interesting because the other working
assumption is that the corporate 6lite has an undifferentiated class
interest: profit-making. This will lead to the eventual failure of the
corporate social responsibility proposals. In the end, if we, as a society,
continue to place reliance on the profit-making activities of dominant
members of the corporate sector for our welfare and we remain wedded
to the political ideology which goes with that economic approach,
exhortations made to the corporate sector to subjugate its pursuit of profit
to some extent will not work. The dominant corporations' ability to
command respect from the state depends on the power which stems from
their control over investment; the ability of the state to demand respect
and more caring treatment from these corporations is limited by its
inability to back-up its demands with force as long as the use of private
property owners to make profits remains the central means of producing
economic welfare. Moreover, the corporate sector's ability to penetrate
state institutions will in no way be impaired. The creation of new
corporate governance structures will suggest that something has been
done about some troubling issues, while the underlying problem - the
disempowerment of the electorate - will not have been addressed in any
significant way. For a while the corporate image will be improved as we
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will have shown that we are asking the corporate sector to moderate its
behaviour. But, as nothing fundamental will have changed, the dominant
corporations will not be impeded for long. They will walk around the
various versions of the Maginot line which the corporate social
responsibility movement offers.
The corporate responsibility movement has diagnosed the problem
accurately. It is dominant capital and its corollory: the denial of
democracy, a denial which is ever-increasingly manifested by the harm-
inflicting behaviour of large economic actors. The reforms they offer do
not address the causes of the problem, merely the manifestations. It will
not do. Our aspiration to be a real democracy is on the line.
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